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This paper will recognize selected reform efforts directed toward resolving DOD's problematic financial management history; provide examples of and explore reasons for DOD's accounting problems, and analyze what DOD has accomplished to improve accountability of DOD's financial management. In addition, it will provide conclusions and recommendations on efforts DOD should sustain or undertake to improve accountability.
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR REFORM

THE REQUIREMENT TO ACCOUNT FOR PUBLIC MONEY
A regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9
The U.S. Constitution, "the highest law in the land," establishes the requirement for an accounting of public money but DOD has been unable to meet this requirement. Congress has sought reform targeted at improving financial management within the government; through a series of legislative acts. The President and the Secretary of Defense both have included financial reform in their grand strategies. In turn, their actions have elevated the importance and added impetus for financial reform.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
During the last 20 years, Congress enacted five public laws aimed at improving federal financial management. In combination, these acts represent significant and comprehensive management reform. Each successive act either adds to or builds upon the former legislation.
Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982:
The FMFIA sought to improve the internal accounting and administrative controls of each executive agency. The controls were to provide reasonable assurance that: (1) obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable law; (2) funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, or misappropriation; and (3) revenues and expenditures applicable to agency operations are properly recorded and accounted for to permit the preparation of accounts and reliable financial and statistical reports and to maintain accountability over the assets. To ensure compliance with these requirements, the act requires agencies to evaluate their systems of internal accounting and administrative controls for compliance. In connection, the agencies must prepare an annual statement that they fully comply with the requirements of this act. If not compliant they must prepare statements and reports that identify any material weaknesses in the agency's systems of internal accounting control and administrative controls. The statement and reports must include plans and a schedule for correcting any material weakness identified. 4 However, this act barely scratched the surface for achieving accountability-a more complete foundation for reform was needed.
Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO) of 1990:
The CFO act marked the beginning of a new era in federal management and accountability. Aside from a dollar impact, poor accountability can adversely effect mission accomplishment in the defense of our national interests. In addition, as the following examples of "chem-bio suits" will illustrate, poor accountability can potentially put people "in harms way."
In a June 2003 GAO testimony on the status of financial management within DOD, GAO disclosed that DOD and its military services did not know how many Joint Service Lightweight
Integrated Suit Technology (JLIST) 23 suits they had, their condition, and where they were located. This occurred due to several factors that included the use of nonstandard, nonintegrated, stovepiped systems. The methods to control JLIST ranged from stand-alone automated systems, to spreadsheet applications, to pen and paper, to nothing at all.
Consequently, DOD believed it had excess suits and sold them on the Internet for "pennies on the dollar" while simultaneously purchasing hundreds of thousands of new chem-bio suits annually. 24 In the same June 2003 testimony, GAO also described a similar event with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). DLA had problems identifying and removing defective Battle Dress Overgarments (BDO) 25 from inventory. As a result, some of the defective garments were shipped to U.S. forces in high-threat areas. Furthermore, GAO reported that in a June 2000 testimony, the DOD IG pointed out that a physical count of BDOs could not locate 420,000 of the protective suits recorded in DLA's accountability database.
REASONS FOR DOD'S ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS
Arguably a myriad of reasons exist for the problems that hinder DOD from complying with Federal financial management system requirements, generally accepted accounting principles, and the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. However, in searching for a center of gravity a consistent theme emerges from the various government reports and studies. In essence, with its vast and complex array of "business systems" DOD has lacked an overarching integrated business strategy-financial management being a subset.
The sheer size and complexity of DOD is unlike any other organization. DOD's Business Management Modernization Program web site provides the following: "With over $1 trillion in assets, an annual budget of $378 billion and over 3 million military and civilian employees, the Department of Defense (DOD) is the world's largest and most diversified enterprise." 27 DOD also reports responsibility for maintaining an infrastructure of more than 600,000 individual buildings and structures located at more than 6,000 different locations and using more than 30 million acres. In addition, for fiscal year 2002, DOD operated and maintained about 250,000
vehicles, over 15,000 aircraft, more than 1,000 oceangoing vessels, and some 550 public utility systems. 28 To aid in managing the size and complexity of its organization, DOD has an inventory of 2,300 disparate business systems for its day-to-day operations.
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The reason these disparate systems have been allowed to grow is the absence of a systematic and coordinated departmentwide strategy-a lack of an overarching approach to financial management. The question of how did DOD's "amalgamation" of 2,300 systems come about is described in a GAO report on DOD business systems modernization: "As we have previously reported, this systems environment is not the result of a systematic and coordinated departmentwide strategy, but rather is the product of unrelated, stovepiped initiatives to support a set of business operations that are nonstandard and duplicative across DOD components."
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The lack of an overarching approach is identified in what is frequently referred to as the The importance of an enterprise architecture must be underscored and recognized. It is to serve as a road map for transformation of DOD business operations in support of the warfighter. 35 Enterprise architecture is a necessary and important roadmap. It is as important to an organization's operations and systems as a set of blueprints is to a building. This metaphor is described in an Executive Guide published by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO): "That is, building blueprints provide those who own, construct, and maintain the building with a clear and understandable picture of the building's uses, features, functions, and supporting systems, including relevant building standards. Further, the building blueprints capture the relationships among building components and govern the construction process.
Enterprise architectures do nothing less, providing to people at all organizational levels an explicit, common, and meaningful structural frame of reference that allows an understanding of
(1) what the enterprise does; (2) when, where, how, and why it does it; and (3) what it uses to do it." 36 Hence an enterprise architecture is needed to achieve greater internal efficiencies, streamline business operations, and improve inter-agency collaboration. In addition, the use of architectures is a crucial means to a challenging end: agency operational structures that are optimally defined, in both business and technological environments. The alternative is an undesirable "…perpetuation of the kinds of operational environments that saddle most agencies today in which lack of integration among business operations and supporting information technology (IT) resources leads to inefficiencies and duplication."
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ANALYSIS OF WHAT DOD HAS ACCOMPLISHED
This section will briefly review DOD's past reform efforts which have been unsuccessful at improving financial management. Additionally, this section will analyze DOD's current reform efforts which show progress but with much work remaining.
PAST FAILED REFORM EFFORTS
Specific financial reform Efforts undertaken by DOD from 1989 to 1997 have been unsuccessful in developing a systematic and coordinated strategy to improve financial management. As chronicled in a GAO 2002 report on financial management reform, DOD initiated several broad-based department-wide reform efforts during this period. These efforts were intended to fundamentally reform its financial operations as well as other key business areas. The Defense Reform Initiative, the Defense Business Operations Fund, and the Corporate Information Management initiative have proven to be unsuccessful despite good intentions and substantial effort. Conditions remain unchanged today that led to these previous attempts at reform. These efforts, as described in the GAO report, are highlighted below. "Over the years, we made numerous recommendations to improve CIM's management to help preclude the wasteful use and mismanagement of billion[s] of dollars. However, these recommendations were generally not addressed. Instead, DOD spent billions of dollars with little sound analytical justification. Rather than relying on a rigorous decision-making process for information technology investments-as used in leading private and public organizations we studied, DOD made systems decisions without (1) appropriately analyzing cost, benefits, and technical risks; (2) establishing realistic project schedules; or (3) considering how business process improvements could affect information technology investments. For one effort alone, DOD spent about $700 million trying to develop and implement a single system for the material management business area-but this effort proved unsuccessful. We reported in 1997 that the benefits of CIM had yet to be widely achieved after 8 years of effort and spending about $20 billion. The CIM initiative was eventually abandoned."
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Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF). In October 1991, DOD established DBOF by consolidating nine existing industrial and stock funds and five other activities operated throughout DOD. The intent of DBOF was to bring greater DOD visibility and management to the overall cost for certain critical DOD business operations. However, GAO pointed out that since DBOF's inception, it lacked the policies, procedures, and financial systems to operate in a businesslike manner. In 1996, DOD eliminated DBOF by replacing it with four working capital funds. However, these funds inherited the same operational and financial reporting problems.
GAO's review of these funds disclosed that they still do not provide accurate and timely information on the results of operations. As a result, fund customers cannot be assured that prices charged for goods and services represent actual costs. 
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In response to GAO and Freidman's study that included a recommendation for a DOD- includes data standards and is used to guide the creation of the physical databases where information will be stored." 55 In addition, the report recognized that DOD had taken "…a positive first step, but much remains to be accomplished before DOD will have the kind of blueprint and associated controls to successfully modernize its business operations and supporting systems." 56 DOD was responsive in answering GAO's evaluation of the initial architecture. 57 In essence, DOD disclosed that it will follow an incremental approach as advised by GAO.
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DOD's approach is to focus on reengineering its business processes followed by selection of the business systems solutions. "The first increment will implement the foundation of the architecture and key business processes. Examples are the use of the United States Standard
General Ledger, a standard accounting code structure, data standards, storage and retrieval of data, and logistics processes coupled with the related acquisition and accounting processes."
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A primary implementation challenge associated with enterprise architecture is that DOD component organizations simply find it contrary to their parochial interests. The GAO cites this cultural resistance as a substantial risk to successful development and implementation of an enterprise architecture. 60 In a February 2003 report GAO cited that although DOD had taken some initial steps to improve its management of business system investments 61 it has not been more successful because component organizations, throughout DOD were continuing "to make parochial investment decisions and following different approaches and criteria." How long before DOD can implement the architecture and achieve auditable statements?
Secretary Rumsfeld has estimated that achieving desired financial management and related business transformation goals that rely on longer term system improvements may take 8 or more years. In a testimony on DOD financial management, GAO acknowledged this was "not an unrealistic estimate" based on their research experience with other federal agencies. Although it "took an act of Congress," DOD has reached a key milestone with version 1.0 of its enterprise architecture that lays the foundation needed to develop a well-defined business enterprise architecture. DOD should be commended for reaching this milestone on schedule and under budget and for the progress made toward a fully developed architecture. This success coupled with the importance of an enterprise architecture should compel and provide the urgency for DOD to swiftly address both the National Defense Authorization Act's requirements and adopt GAO's architectural recommendations. As a result, DOD should continue with its incremental approach toward full development and implementation of the DODwide Business Enterprise Architecture. DoD should ensure the architecture adequately describes the accounting and financial management requirements and, among others, addresses the use of the United States standard General Ledger, a standard accounting code structure, data standards, and, storage and retrieval of data.
Controlling the money for DOD's ongoing and planned business systems investment is the key to eliminating parochial investment decisions. Allowing component organizations throughout DoD to make parochial investments is an impediment to implementing an enterprise architecture. GAO's questions and recommendations regarding DOD's business investment decisions make sense. Specifically, DOD does need to ensure consistency across domains for architecture extensions and changes. In addition, DOD needs to control the money for IT projects by establishing a hierarchy of investment review boards that uses an explicit and common set of criteria for selecting, controlling, and evaluating IT projects. DOD may have an alternative approach but at a minimum should have an explicit and common set of criteria for selecting, controlling, and evaluating business systems investment.
DOD should be applauded for its tremendous efforts and encouraged, and at times pressured, to continue its endeavors to transform DOD's business operations. Specifically, among many other required actions, DOD should become a credible steward for "public money"
by improving accountability. Ensuring effective accountability will ultimately result in auditable financial statements. GAO effectively narrates the "bottom line:"
"With the events of September 11, and the federal government's short-and longterm budget challenges, it is more important than ever that DOD effectively transform its business operations to ensure that it gets the most from every dollar spent. The department must be able to effectively carry out its stewardship responsibilities for the funding it receives and for the vast amount of equipment and inventories used in support of military operations. Even before the events of September 11, increased globalization, changing security threats, and rapid technological advances were prompting fundamental changes in the environment in which DOD operates. These trends place a premium on increasing strategic planning, enhancing results orientation, ensuring effective accountability, maintaining transparency, and using integrated approaches." 70 In summary, to keep DOD's momentum the following actions are recommended:
• Ensure top leadership support. This is critical for continued success. This must be affirmed by financial management reform remaining on DOD's top 10 priority list.
• Pursue full development and implementation of the DOD-wide Business Enterprise Architecture via an incremental approach. In the appropriate increment ensure the architecture adequately describes the accounting and financial management requirements. Among others, address the use of the United States standard General Ledger, a standard accounting code structure, data standards, and. storage and retrieval of data.
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